Understanding the Progress of Science by McCoy, C.D.




A problem-solving-based account of scientific progress that takes understanding as the
principal epistemic aim of science is developed and defended against knowledge reduc-
tionism.
1 Introduction
Much of the recent explosion of literature on scientific progress was ignited by Bird’s provoca-
tive article “What Is Scientific Progress?” (Bird, 2007), where he advocates an “epistemic”
account of scientific progress, a kind of view which he alleges is lately overlooked, despite
its venerable history. In making room for his account, Bird criticizes what he takes to have
been the most prominent accounts of scientific progress advanced in the latter half of the 20th
century. He claims that realist philosophers of science have often taken truth to be the ultimate
goal of science and its progress to be properly characterized by an accumulation of truths, or
at least an approximating approach to them. By contrast, historically-minded philosophers of
science and anti-realists have frequently rejected the realists’ notion of truth as a goal of sci-
ence, instead preferring to characterize progress in terms of, among other things, success in
problem-solving, as in the well-known views of Kuhn (1996) and Laudan (1977). In his paper,
Bird criticizes the realists for overlooking the importance of justification to progress and the
anti-realists for giving up on truth—both regarded as being essential elements of the generally
received conception of knowledge in analytic epistemology. According to Bird, it is knowl-
edge that should properly be regarded as the principal aim of science: science makes progress
precisely when it realizes the accumulation of scientific knowledge.1
The ensuing discussion has generated many responses to Bird’s view (Dellsén, 2018), many
of which have come from supporters of (some version of) the truth-based realist account, but
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1Bird calls his account “epistemic,” in line with the usual assumption that epistemology is fundamentally
concerned with knowledge (Bird, 2010). This is a point which will be under dispute in this paper, since I (and
many contemporary epistemologists) hold that the subject matter of epistemology has a broader scope than just
knowledge, particularly the mainstream conception of it in analytic epistemology.
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there have also been some supporters of Bird’s view that knowledge is the aim of science, as
well as others that have promoted accounts based on the idea that understanding makes better
sense as a goal of science than knowledge. For the most part, the authors involved in this
debate are avowed scientific realists, so they typically dismiss anti-realism quickly, and along
with it the problem-solving approach to scientific progress, which they take to be untenable (or
irrelevant) due to its assumed commitment to anti-realism. In my view, this attitude towards the
problem-solving approach to scientific progress is unfortunate, not only because I have found
it insightful for understanding important episodes in science in my own work (McCoy, 2015,
2019) but, more generally, because much of what is of value in the problem-solving approach
is in fact independent of the essentially metaphysical issue of scientific realism, based as it is on
the importance of scientific problems and problem-solving within scientific practice (Nickles,
1981).
Nevertheless, whatever the merits of the problem-solving approach, it is fair to say, as
Bird does, that it lacks a clearly identified epistemic (or, as Dellsén prefers to say, cognitive)
goal. Indeed, Kuhn and Laudan explicitly reject characterizing it in familiar epistemological
terms, for they famously reject the presuppositions of mainstream epistemology, especially
those concerning the nature of knowledge, truth, and justification.2 As for the prospects of
developing an alternative approach to epistemology, one which takes its cue from the problem-
solving practices of science, one will find relatively little encouragement in the principal works
of Kuhn and Laudan, instead only scattered remarks such as that problem-solving is “the single
most general cognitive aim of science” (Laudan, 1977, 124) (which leaves it completely unclear
why problem-solving in itself should be a valuable aim at all) or that scientists solve puzzles
because they simply like the challenge (Kuhn, 1996, xx).3
The course of epistemology has, however, broadened in the intervening years (i.e., since
the heyday of debates over scientific progress), such that it now seems possible to assimilate
the problem-solving approach to scientific progress and its distinctive characteristics into the
currents of epistemological inquiry. My aim in this paper is to furnish a problem-solving-based
characterization of the progress of science that addresses the shortcoming identified by Bird,
and I do this by taking understanding rather than knowledge as the principal epistemic aim of
science. While it is intuitive that the point of solving problems is to achieve a higher degree
of understanding (and not just to come to know their solutions), this intuitive idea is able to
receive a deeper philosophical explication thanks to relatively recent developments in episte-
mology concerning the concept of understanding. Many of these developments have been in
response to the value problem of knowledge, in the face of which philosophers have increas-
ingly concluded that knowledge lacks a sufficiently distinctive value to deserve pride of place in
epistemology, with several philosophers (Elgin, 1996; Zagzebski, 1996; Kvanvig, 2003; Riggs,
2003; Pritchard, 2010) making compelling cases that it is in fact understanding which has the
needed kind of distinctive value to make sense of our epistemic practices. Although I will not
adopt any of their specific proposals here, I believe that the considerations which lead them to
focus on understanding are importantly relevant to the proper characterization of progress in
science and, in particular, fit well with the problem-solving approach.
2As Laudan says, “the initially plausible, and broadly held, view that theory testing and theory evaluation are
at root...epistemological activities” is “fundamentally mistaken and systematically misleading” (Laudan, 2000,
165). Kuhn, for his part, did think that truth was an important standard, even a necessary one, within the context
of a paradigm—just not the “utopian” truth of the realist, a “goal set by nature in advance” of our inquiry into it
(Kuhn, 1996, 171).
3That said, Laudan does promote a sort of meta-epistemology of his own, which he calls “normative natural-
ism” (Laudan, 1984, 1987). According to normative naturalism, the aims of science shift over time in a way that
requires re-conceiving the remit of “epistemology” as scientific values change.
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As noted above, some responses to Bird’s arguments have already made the move to base
their accounts of scientific progress on understanding rather than knowledge (e.g., (Dellsén,
2016; Bangu, 2017)). Despite basic agreement on the significance of understanding to science,
advocates of these views have embraced diverse analyses of the concept of understanding. To
my mind, though, none of these analyses is fully adequate to grounding a satisfying problem-
solving-based account of progress, for none captures the essentials of problem-solving, which
I regard as integral to the practice of science. Therefore, my approach in this paper will be to
consider the role and significance of problem-solving in science from the very beginning, in
order to bring out its intuitive relation to our pre-theoretic concept of understanding (§2). This
relation will then feature centrally in my own account of what (scientific) understanding is and
why I believe it is the principal epistemic aim of science (§3). In the final section, I defend the
account against the threat of its reduction to (scientific) knowledge (§4).
2 Problem-Solving as a Measure of Scientific Understanding
Rather than survey actual cases of problem-solving in science or refer to scientific work on
problem-solving, I will make use of Kuhn’s well-known analysis of scientific change into re-
curring stages of normal and revolutionary science in order to draw the role and significance of
problem-solving in science. I do this not because I believe Kuhn gives the best characterization
of how science proceeds but simply because his views are widely known and therefore can be
easily used to highlight some key aspects of problem-solving practices in science. I will make
an intuitive connection between these practices, as seen in Kuhn’s stages, and our ordinary,
pre-theoretic conception of understanding.
Recall that for Kuhn science is roughly split into two periodic phases: normal science
and revolutionary science. Normal science is carried out by practitioners working within a
paradigm, which, besides the scientific theories relevant to the phenomena studied under that
paradigm, includes such things as exemplars, shared values, a material culture of instrumen-
tation, and also metaphysical views. Whatever else these elements contribute to a paradigm’s
role in science, during normal science they are meant to legitimate “the puzzles and problems
that the community works on” (Kuhn, 1996, xxiii). The paradigm sets out, broadly speaking,
which problems practitioners should aim to solve and which methods and techniques should be
used to solve them. According to Kuhn’s picture, we should nevertheless expect that anomalies
inevitably appear. These anomalies eventually come to threaten the paradigm, at last push-
ing scientists to seek a replacement paradigm, which then ushers in the phase of revolutionary
science. Once a new paradigm is adopted, the cycle then begins anew.
Going beyond Kuhn’s particular descriptive aims, we may ask, “what is the primary epis-
temic aim of puzzle-solving during normal science?” To a philosopher tutored in mainstream
epistemology (the “theory of knowledge”), the natural answer would be “knowledge of puzzle-
solutions.” And indeed, normal science has a highly cumulative character characteristic of
ordinary knowledge acquisition. Kuhn himself mentions three ways that scientific practitioners
operating within normal science contribute to the accumulation of knowledge (Kuhn, 1996, 24):
(1) by extending the knowledge of the facts that established the paradigm; (2) by increasing the
extent of match between predictions and those facts; (3) by further articulating the paradigm
itself. It is therefore inviting, given the salience of normal science in the overall course of sci-
ence (according to Kuhn anyway) and this highly cumulative creation of knowledge, to regard
knowledge as the principal epistemic aim of normal science’s puzzle-solving.
Certainly, extended and increased knowledge of facts, explanations, articulations, etc. are
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of significant epistemic value. However, no pure axiology of knowledge can explain why scien-
tists seek certain facts, certain explanations, certain articulations, etc. in the context of normal
science (a point which Bird, incidentally, makes himself). Items of knowledge are all alike in
being items of knowledge; to distinguish some items of knowledge as more valuable than others
therefore demands that additional considerations be brought to bear. For some philosophers,
these additional considerations are pragmatic, psychological, sociological, etc.—not properly
epistemic. Is there another, better way to connect puzzle-solving and epistemology, one that
does not leave much of the practice outside the latter’s scope?
Indeed there is, for there is another important function of solving puzzles and problems set
by a paradigm, one that is primarily evaluative in character, which is to determine how effective
the paradigm is at solving the problems it sets. For sure, an individual puzzle-solver need not
personally care about assessing his or her paradigm’s viability, explanatory power, or whatever
else is regarded as of epistemic value. Even so, on analysis solving puzzles can be seen to
have this evaluative function for both the individual scientist and the community of scientists
alike, since whether a scientist solves a puzzle intuitively depends not only on whether it can be
solved given the resources of the paradigm by the community of scientists but also on whether
the scientist him- or herself possesses the necessary skill and knowledge to solve the puzzles
he or she attempts. If he or she succeeds at solving many and various puzzles, then, as Kuhn
says, he or she “proves him[- or her]self an expert puzzle-solver” Kuhn (1996, 36). While such
expertise at puzzle-solving may certainly have its social merits, from an epistemological point
of view, individual or collective success at solving puzzles is also naturally read as evidence
(defeasible evidence, of course) of the paradigm’s effectiveness at solving the problems it sets.
To the typical realist philosopher of science, scientists’ puzzle-solving practices would be
understood as intended to produce evidence in order to assess the degree to which the paradigm
(theory, model, etc.) is true or truthlike (or known or knowledge-like). However, even if occa-
sionally scientists think that is what they are doing, they are (almost universally) in no position
to actually make such an assessment (due, e.g., to the problem of unconceived alternatives,
etc.). Scientific realism may be a live philosophical issue, but it is not one that can (or should)
make a difference to what scientists actually do. Therefore, it remains to find if there is a
way to read the practical aim of puzzle-solving practices in an epistemological way while still
maintaining a clear connection to scientific practice.
I propose that there is such a way, one rooted in our intuitive, pre-theoretic concept of
understanding: scientists are (whether individually or collectively) evaluating their degree of
understanding, not knowledge. In the first place, it makes intuitive sense to say that a successful
puzzle-solving scientist in normal science is both demonstrating the understanding afforded by
the epistemic resources of the paradigm and also demonstrating his or her own understanding
achieved through this paradigm as well. Scientists, of course, may be seen as demonstrating
their knowledge and the knowledge inherent in their paradigm as well. Attention to the prac-
tice of puzzle-solving, however, suggests that this kind of “understanding” sought by puzzle-
solving has a somewhat different character than knowledge. It emerges in particular from
thinking about what makes a normal science practitioner skilled, what someone who has an ex-
pert understanding (of his or her paradigm) can do. Intuitively, a skilled scientific practitioner
(in normal science) is someone who is able to produce facts and explanations, specifically ones
that solve empirical and conceptual problems set by his or her paradigm—in particular by using
the conceptual means at his or her disposal (i.e., as given the paradigm). Thus, puzzle-solving
(1) is a test of ability (not of knowledge, at least not directly), which (2) does not generally
involve the prior possession (knowledge) of puzzle-solutions (indeed, if the puzzle-solver had
the solution already, then we could hardly regard his or her activity as puzzle-solving, much
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less him or her as a skilled puzzle-solver). Understanding, unlike knowledge, aptly describes
the aim of puzzle-solving given these two conditions on it, for it is intuitively correct to say that
puzzle-solving tests one’s ability to understand (and not to know), and it is clear that one can
understand how to solve puzzles without knowing their solutions in advance.
Further aspects of a problem-solving-oriented conception of scientific understanding are
suggested by the second phase of Kuhn’s scheme, revolutionary science. Let us briefly recall
how Kuhn describes revolutionary science. The phase first emerges after persistent anomalies
eventually overcome the resistance to change of scientists bound within a paradigm, which
leads to the breakdown of the normal science puzzle-solving activity of scientists. As anomalies
accumulate, Kuhn describes science as being “in a state of growing crisis” (Kuhn, 1996, 67).
Scientists do not respond to crisis by abandoning their paradigm right away, although they do
begin considering alternatives which might solve the prevailing paradigm’s mounting problems.
However, if a newly developing paradigm’s supporters are competent (and fortunate), then, as
Kuhn says, “they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it would be like to
belong to the community guided by it” (Kuhn, 1996, 159).
From this brief description of revolutionary science, it is evident that problem-solving is
also an essential activity of this phase, although here it takes on a slightly different character
than it does in normal science (i.e., it is not mere “puzzle-solving” anymore, for the puzzles
are no longer set in advance by the dominant paradigm). An expert revolutionary science
problem-solver may not be an expert normal science puzzle-solver, and vice-versa, but both
are distinguished by their ability to produce solutions to contextually salient problems. Thus,
the epistemic rationale behind “revolutionary” activities is intuitively characterizable in terms
of understanding as well, to wit, to develop a novel understanding which is lacking in the
present paradigm. Of course, for Kuhn himself there are no rules to assess whether one such
“understanding” is objectively better than another, since it is crucial to his view that there is
no rationally compelling (i.e., rule-based) reason that practitioners adopt a particular paradigm
(Kuhn, 1977). Nevertheless, Kuhn does allow that scientists must be convinced on two impor-
tant points: (i) that the new paradigm must promise to resolve some outstanding problem which
can seemingly be solved in no other way; (ii) that the new paradigm must also preserve a large
part of the prior paradigm’s problem-solving ability. Both of these pertain to the “problem-
solving effectiveness” (borrowing Laudan’s term) of the new paradigm in comparison to the
old. It is appealing, therefore, to interpret problem-solving in revolutionary science in similar
epistemological terms, namely, as evaluative of the potential understanding afforded by a newly
developing paradigm.
By examining both normal science and revolutionary science, we see that the problem-
solving activities found in Kuhn’s account of science suggestively point to a single, unified
epistemic goal of understanding rather than knowledge. There are, however, important differ-
ences between the problem-solving of the two phases. Normal science problem-solving activity
is “backward-looking” and assessive, for it is primarily intended to evaluate the degree of un-
derstanding so far achieved in the current, established paradigm. Importantly, the production
of cumulative knowledge in the form of new problem-solutions (facts and explanations) is sec-
ondary and instrumental to this more essential function. In revolutionary science, by contrast,
problem-solving is “forward-looking” and diagnostic, for it is primarily intended to evaluate
the potential for understanding which may be achieved through solving problems with the new
resources furnished by the future paradigm under development. The production of individual
items of knowledge is, again, secondary and instrumental to the more essential function of
establishing a new understanding.
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3 Understanding as the Principal Epistemic Aim of Science
The previous section suggested an intuitive connection between problem-solving and a form
of understanding, established by reference to the problem-solving activities of science. In
this section, I will now proceed more systematically in the task of developing an account of
scientific progress, one which is based on the concept of understanding which is suggested by
the problem-solving practice of science. I also aim to show that understanding, not knowledge,
is the principal epistemic aim of science and is the epistemic concept against which scientific
progress should be primarily measured.
Observers of both the older and newer debates about scientific explanation and understand-
ing will no doubt be aware that I am far from alone in suggesting the relevance of understanding
to the issue of scientific progress. Philosophers of science have frequently mooted the idea that
understanding is an important product of science, especially in motivating their own favored ac-
counts of scientific explanation (e.g., (Friedman, 1974; Strevens, 2008)). However, this was of-
ten done in the past without explicating precisely how explanation is related to understanding—
or even explaining what understanding is (as Kim (1994) and de Regt and Dieks (2005), for ex-
ample, have remarked). Persistent uncertainty over the nature of understanding has made room
for another long-standing tradition in the philosophy of science according to which understand-
ing is is merely “psychological” and hence lacking in any objective epistemic significance at all,
starting with Hempel’s influential studies of explanation (Hempel, 1965), continuing through
van Fraassen’s pragmatic account of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980), and finding more recent
expression in the work of Trout (2002).
The recent tide of support in epistemology for a genuinely objective, epistemic notion of
understanding (e.g., (Elgin, 1996; Zagzebski, 1996; Kvanvig, 2003; Riggs, 2003; Pritchard,
2010)), which is one of the main motivations for this paper, is not without its critics. Against
this tide stand some who, while accepting that there is such a notion, believe that the new
epistemology of understanding has added little to the long-established epistemology of knowl-
edge. Indeed, several philosophers have argued that understanding reduces to (or merely is a
species of) knowledge, especially explanatory knowledge (e.g., (Grimm, 2006; Khalifa, 2012;
Strevens, 2013)). If it were true that understanding really is essentially knowledge (at least for
all epistemological purposes), then the import of understanding would be quite minimal indeed.
I defer my discussion of this important issue to the final section of this paper in favor of first
arguing for the priority of understanding as the epistemic aim of science, relying for now on
the intuition (and the indications of the previous section) that knowledge and understanding are
sufficiently distinct concepts.
So much for preparatory remarks. To begin elaborating my account of scientific understand-
ing, I wish to draw attention first to the epistemic significance of (theoretical) explanations in
science, which indicates that the distinctive locus of epistemic value in science is not the bare
scientific fact—it is scientific theory. By theory I mean not only theory in the sense of general,
abstract laws, etc. but also other explanatory and descriptive resources, from scientific frame-
works or paradigms to concrete models. Empiricist scruples may incline some towards the view
that theory is too ephemeral to have real epistemic significance, which leads to the position that
the sole epistemic content of science should not to be identified with scientific theory but with
the empirical facts. Nevertheless, even the most hard-nosed empiricist must admit that scien-
tific theory is indispensable for securing the greater part of those empirical facts which we do
possess. Thus, in the case where scientific explanations are accepted as genuinely epistemic in
character, theory is clearly the fundamental seat of epistemic value in science; when not, theory
remains the indispensable vehicle of epistemic value in science, and that will suffice for present
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purposes.
Since one can, linguistically at any rate, treat scientific theories as objects in epistemic lo-
cutions attributing understanding to an agent, one might, following Kvanvig, characterize our
understanding of scientific theories as “objectual” (Kvanvig, 2003). Although many philoso-
phers have been willing to entertain a category of objectual understanding, it remains in dispute
how this kind of understanding should be properly analyzed. For example, some authors, in-
cluding Kvanvig, talk of the objects of objectual understanding as bodies of beliefs, while
highlighting the coherence, holism, or integration of these beliefs as crucial for their status as
objects. While I agree with proponents of objectual understanding that it is a distinct category
among kinds of understanding and that understanding a theory can be described as a kind of
objectual understanding, I will not be following those who hold that theories are best thought
of as bodies of propositions that collectively admit of belief (for reasons to be explained shortly
and also further in the final section). I will also avoid making use of the notion of objectual
understanding directly, since for the purposes of scientific epistemology the category of objec-
tual understanding is far too broad. Phenomena can be understood “objectually” just as well
as theory, yet theories and phenomena must be distinguished into epistemologically distinct
categories in order to make sense of scientific methodology, particularly as it is theories that
explain phenomena and not vice versa. Our understanding of phenomena is asymmetrically
dependent on understanding theory. Instead I will prefer to speak of theoretical understanding
(Saatsi, 2019) and understanding phenomena with theories (Strevens, 2013).
One might think that there is nevertheless not much of epistemological significance in mark-
ing a distinction between scientific facts (or propositions, if you like) and scientific theories,
since it might seem that theories are nothing more than collections of scientific facts (or propo-
sitions). To be sure, if scientific theories were merely collections of propositions, then “believ-
ing a theory” would be nothing more than believing that collection of propositions. I allow, at
least for some logical and epistemological purposes, that treating theories as if they were such
is sometimes fruitful and relatively harmless. Actual theories in scientific practice, however,
the ones that scientists use, are surely not collections of facts, propositions, or whatever else.
In the first place, scientific theories are clearly not learned as collections of facts and are not
communicated as such either (which is not to say that learning and communicating facts are
not, respectively, part of learning and communication). If someone memorized the entirety of
Weinberg’s Quantum Theory of Fields (in three volumes), they would hardly thereby come to
know quantum field theory, let alone understand it. That is because understanding (or know-
ing) a theory is a matter of practical engagement with that theory, applying it to problems set
by the descriptive and explanatory scope of the theory. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish
scientific facts from scientific theories in order to understand the practice of science.
Therefore, I claim that theoretical understanding is essentially practical and constructive.
To practicing scientists, scientific theories (or models) are tools to be applied, specifically in
order to understand (including explaining and describing) phenomena. Much as the nature of
a hammer is not its mere being as an object but primarily as a piece of equipment, a means of
hammering, the nature of theories is not their mere being as objects (bodies of knowledge) but
primarily as a means of theorizing about phenomena. They are the tools of science. Although to
some this perspective on theories might suggest an unpalatable “instrumentalism,” highlighting
the practical dimension of theories does not actually entail anything untoward about their fac-
tual status, much less about the descriptions and explanations produced by their application.4
4Such a generally practical and constructive point of view is widely adopted already in the literature on scien-
tific models. Some do use it to press for a more specifically anti-realist stance towards theories, e.g., (Cartwright
et al., 1995), but not all—cf. the different perspectives on offer in (Morgan and Morrison, 1999).
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Instead, the practical and constructive nature of understanding should draw attention rather to
the central role of the agent’s abilities to use such conceptual tools to solve problems. In the lit-
erature on scientific understanding, de Regt in particular has emphasized agent abilities in this
way, making them central to his “pragmatic” account of scientific understanding (de Regt and
Dieks, 2005; de Regt, 2009, 2017). De Regt’s (and my) insistence on the essential role of the
agent in an account of understanding is not a concession of the subjectivity of understanding
but rather the recognition of an important cognitive component to understanding, one which
involves the ability to produce knowledge, not just possess it.
The basic statement of my account of understanding and progress with respect to it can
now be given. First, possessing a (scientific) understanding of some subject matter is me-
diated by one or more (scientific) theories of that subject matter—this is the requirement of
“understanding phenomena with theories.” Second, understanding some subject matter with a
theory depends on having the ability to produce explanations and descriptions pertaining to that
subject matter, that is, solving explanatory and descriptive problems within the scope of that
theory. Hence, understanding a theory means being able to understand phenomena with that
theory. Third, and finally, progress in understanding simply involves improvement in theoret-
ical understanding, which is a matter of improved ability to explain and describe phenomena,
the degree of which is something evaluable by a problem-solving standard.5
To argue for the priority of this kind of understanding among epistemic aims of science, I
will first introduce two broad, archetypal conceptions of epistemology and accounts of theoreti-
cal progress based on them. According to what I will call the knowledge-centered epistemology,
scientific theories are collections of propositions, so that knowing a theory is simply knowing
a collection of propositions. Epistemic progress according to the knowledge-centered epis-
temology is identified with the accumulation of knowledge (as in Bird’s epistemic account),
or the increasing verisimilitude of the epistemic content of scientific theories (according to
the garden-variety realist). According to what I will call the understanding-centered episte-
mology, by contrast, scientific theories are conceptual tools, not collections of facts. Under-
standing a theory is having the ability to use that theory to produce knowledge (of facts and
explanations), especially in response to scientific problems. Epistemic progress according to
the understanding-centered epistemology is identified with the increase of understanding, an
increase in the ability to solve scientific problems by producing good descriptions and expla-
nations of phenomena that pertain to the subject matters of the relevant theories.
The understanding-centered epistemology acknowledges the epistemic significance of pro-
ductive abilities in the epistemology of science. The knowledge-centered epistemology focuses
only on the value and significance of certain products of science: items of knowledge. From the
perspective of the understanding-centered epistemology, however, these items of knowledge
have only instrumental value and significance, insofar as they contribute to increased under-
standing. Leaving no place for the productive abilities necessary for explaining and grounding
the growth of knowledge, the knowledge-centered epistemology can only give a static, skeletal
picture of science and its epistemology. Certainly, such an epistemology is able to account for
the storage and sharing of items of knowledge, as propositional knowledge may be recorded
and transmitted (assuming some basic abilities of comprehension and of judging the reliability
5As Insa Lawler has pointed out to me, Strevens (2013, 515) states a similar sounding account of understand-
ing: “ to understand a theory is to have the ability to use the theory to construct, or at least to comprehend,
internally correct scientific explanations of a range of phenomena.” Where my view departs most significantly
from Strevens’ is that he links understanding to the grasping of explanations, the latter construed as a structured
set of propositions, whereas I believe understanding involves the ability to provide explanations and descriptions
which respond to problems set by the theoretical context.
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of testifiers). It can also give a simple standard of progress, since static bodies of proposi-
tional knowledge can be compared both synchronically and diachronically. But how can such
items of knowledge alone license increases in knowledge? Epistemologists of science have
traditionally avoided this crucial issue by shunting the means of increasing knowledge off into
“psychology” or “pragmatics” (as in empiricist or hypothetico-deductivist approaches). How-
ever, I object strongly to this maneuver, for to do so is to limit the scope of epistemology and
limit our philosophical understanding of science. There must be a place made for the scientist,
and not just the “science.”
It is only the understanding-centered epistemology that provides the conceptual framework
needed for elucidating the epistemic progress of science. It is centered on the idea that growth
is a matter of production, production which depends on having the right tools for the job and
the ability to use them. Epistemically speaking, what is intrinsically valuable is cognitive
ability, not its product alone. This is because knowledge’s epistemic value is dependent on
the understanding to which it is related. To be sure, having an understanding does depend
on the possession of some knowledge, but this knowledge is only partly constitutive of the
understanding possessed. And while the growth of knowledge is an essential concomitant of
the growth of understanding, it is the growth of understanding that is the principal epistemic
goal of scientific practice. Scientific progress should accordingly be characterized, then, as
increase in understanding.
4 Understanding, Explanation, and Knowledge
Just above I contrasted two broad epistemological approaches to characterizing progress in sci-
ence: the knowledge-centered and the understanding-centered, arguing in favor of the priority
of the latter, especially for how it captures the dynamic growth of science. The existence of this
contrast, however, depends on my conception of understanding not being reducible to knowl-
edge (or some arrangement of knowledge).6 If it is, then my account rests on an illusion, for
then the growth of understanding can be accounted for in traditional, knowledge-based episte-
mological terms, despite my claims to the contrary. While I cannot give an elaborate defense
of the distinction on which my argument rests in the remaining space available here, I can at
least offer some further reasons why assimilating understanding to knowledge is a mistake.7
In the previous section, I argued that scientific progress should be characterized in terms
of theoretical progress, since the epistemic content and value of science resides predominantly
in its theories. Of course, it is consistent with this claim that scientific theories have epis-
temic value because of the propositional knowledge which constitutes them (or because they
approximate propositional knowledge). This is a fundamental idea of what I have called the
6It is worth mentioning that some relate understanding not to propositional knowledge (“know that”) but to a
different kind of knowledge, some kind of practical knowledge or “know-how,” such as Zagzebski (2001) and Hills
(2016). While relating understanding to knowledge in this way has a strong affinity with the account I offer here, I
hesitate to make too much of the connection, because the practical, “cognitive know-how” of understanding is not
obviously analogous to conventional examples of know-how (like riding a bike or wielding a hammer) (Sullivan,
2018).
7Other philosophers have argued that understanding is distinct from knowledge on different grounds. How-
ever, they generally maintain the propositional nature of theories (regarding them as bodies of information) and
appeal variously to a certain holism, coherence, integration, or unification inherent in those bodies of informa-
tion as the mark of understanding (Friedman, 1974; Cooper, 1994; Zagzebski, 2001; Kvanvig, 2003; Elgin, 2007;
?). Although I cannot argue it here, I believe that these suggestions cannot account for the epistemic value of
understanding as understood in this paper. Instead, it seems to me that these features have mainly to do with
distinguishing theories from one another, i.e., with epistemic compartmentalization.
9
knowledge-centered account of scientific progress: improving our theories means improving
our knowledge (whether that be restricted to empiricist-sanctioned knowledge or else approxi-
mate knowledge with respect to the world-as-everything-that-is-the-case). It is also consistent,
though, with my preferred view, that scientific theories have epistemic value because with them
one is able to understand. This is the core idea of what I have called the understanding-centered
account of scientific progress: improving our theories means increasing our understanding. At
this level of description, then, the two approaches are not obviously opposed, for it is con-
ceivable that the cognitive abilities which are distinctive of understanding may be rendered in
terms of propositional knowledge or that propositional knowledge may be rendered in terms of
cognitive abilities.
However, the reduction of one concept to the other is ill-advised, for each plays an impor-
tant and distinctive role in a comprehensive scientific epistemology. To see how, consider the
activity of solving explanatory problems. When one is able to deliver an explanation, prompted
by an explanatory problem, it is intuitive to say that it is because one has the relevant theoretical
understanding (understanding “with,” as Strevens (2013) puts it). Owing to one’s theoretical
understanding, one has additionally an explanatory understanding of the explanandum (under-
standing “why”) and, further, propositional understanding of the propositions involved in that
particular explanation (understanding “what”). Understanding, then, “flows down” from theory
to explanation to individual propositions. In other words, it is in virtue of the relevant objectual
(or theoretical) understanding that one has explanatory understanding in the specific problem-
context, and in virtue of these understandings together that one has the relevant propositional
understanding of the facts involved in the explanation. Knowledge, as it is usually conceived,
works differently than understanding. It “flows up” from proposition to theory. This is because
knowledge of propositions is the basic form of knowledge. In order to know an explanation (of
a phenomenon), one must know the propositions involved in that explanation and know that
they are related explanatorily; in order to know a theory, one must know certain explanations
and descriptions that are important concomitants of that theory, and know that they are related
together theoretically. Both processes—the flow of understanding and the flow of knowledge—
are important and intimately related elements of scientific activity. The failure to acknowledge
either one would leave some epistemically valuable elements of science unaccounted for.
The conceit of the knowledge-centered epistemology is that the latter scheme is entirely suf-
ficient to account for the epistemic value of our theories, explanations, and propositions. This
aggrandizement of propositional knowledge is a traditional dogma of contemporary epistemol-
ogy. The many successes of this dogma to account for much involved in our epistemic practices
has, however, obscured essential facets of epistemology, like learning, conceptual change, and
inference. Insofar as these are handled at all in epistemology, they are treated as items to be
baked into the propositional mold. Static propositions, however, are the wrong tools for the
job, and necessarily force dynamic concepts (like learning, change, and inference) to become
mere trivialities (e.g., “learning is the acquisition of new propositions,” “conceptual change
happens when the intension associated with a concept term changes,” “inference is a pattern
of propositions where one is related to the others by valid rules”) while failing to account for
(or even acknowledge) the process itself. It is a fine epistemology for machines, perhaps, but
it leaves out much that makes knowledge and other epistemic concepts humanly significant.
These aspects, rooted in human experience, should not be obscured or eliminated for the sake
of easy analysis.
To illustrate and underscore the point, I conclude with a famous example. The example,
Carroll’s famous story of the tortoise and Achilles (Carroll, 1895), is meant to show (as I
interpret it anyway) that no amount of knowledge can stand in for the ability to infer. The
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tortoise in the tale is willing to assent to as many premises as Achilles provides him: that P,
that P→ Q, that {P, P→ Q} ` Q, etc. However, the tortoise refuses to assent to the conclusion
that Q. That is, the tortoise will not infer that Q, despite the apparent logical compulsion to do
so. What lesson is there in this parable? To my mind, it shows that propositional knowledge
(including additional theorizing at meta-levels of analysis) by itself cannot fully capture the
nature of inference, for the basic reason that inference is fundamentally a practical, skilled
activity.8 If the tortoise fails to understand anything in Carroll’s story, it is that he fails to
understand how the theory of inference is supposed to be related to the practical activity of
making inferences (although, then again, one might suppose that he actually understands it all
too well, to the detriment of Achilles...).
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. 2010. “The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view” Synthese 175: 5–16.
Carroll, Lewis. 1895. “What the Tortoise said to Achilles.” Mind 4: 278–280.
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